The Taliban began their military upsurge at the beginning of 2020 once Donald Trump made it clear he wanted American troops out of Afghanistan, and for which he was willing to negotiate with the Taliban, a globally designated terrorist group! The image of Americans and the Taliban negotiating sent a signal to the people of Afghanistan that they were dispensable and would have to fend for themselves. But like all military withdrawals, it was meant to be orderly, planned and with dignity that behoves a professional service. It was nothing of the sort, and in fact set the stage for the Taliban surge of last week. 

 

The Taliban success is directly proportionate to the speed of Washington’s vacation of military space in Afghanistan. And as with the oldest lesson in physics, nature does not entertain a vacuum. The same holds true for political and military power, both of which Taliban seek to deploy in Afghanistan. It is testimony to the ignorance of ground realities that early intelligence estimates had put Taliban success as probable by the end of the year. That date has been repeatedly drawn forward, to the point where nobody pays any attention anymore, for events on the ground make such estimates irrelevant. 

 

What is relevant, though, is that events have moved in such a manner they’ve made life difficult for those sitting on the fence. The rapidity of the Taliban’s surge and the ease with which government troops and supported militias are surrendering or vacating the space has put a big spanner into the spokes of those who believed Afghanistan was a political problem. It is a far more than that, and those without a sense of history, or the stomach, and the spine to support it, aren’t going to get a handle on it. 

 

On Friday 13 Aug India joined Germany, Norway, Qatar, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, the US and the UN, in issuing a statement ‘that they will not recognise any government in Afghanistan that is imposed through the use of military force,’ and, ‘Participants committed to assist in the reconstruction of Afghanistan once a viable political settlement is reached following good faith negotiations between the two sides.’ The Taliban’s response to the statement was to enter Kandahar, the second largest city in Afghanistan and a spiritual home, and a day later mount a serious campaign on Mazar-e-Sharif, the largest city in the north. For the Taliban agreements are only as important as the time it takes for the ink to dry on them. 

 

Statements like these make no difference to the Taliban, or their plans for the eventual goal of taking power. As one of India’s foremost observers on Afghanistan, Shanthie Mariet D’Souza of the Kautilya School of Public Policy recently wrote, ‘Caught between its own internal contradictions of whether to augment its symbolic military assistance to the incumbent government in Kabul, which would further increase the schism between New Delhi and the Taliban and make it a party to the conflict, or to take umbrage under its proclaimed support for an “Afghan-led, Afghan-owned, and Afghan-controlled” peace and reconciliation process, New Delhi’s last-ditch diplomacy in Iran, Qatar, and Russia too has not heralded much hope, nor made any difference to the developments on the ground.’ 

 

India can do the following things. Condemn the Taliban’s surge, which means nothing to a group that is medieval, at best. Then New Delhi can negotiate with the Taliban, but it would be from a weakened position. Talks have been held but not yielded even a word of acknowledgment from the millenarians. Or India can provide military supplies, for after all, the two countries are bound by a strategic partnership since 2011. That would also do little when the hardware is in any case falling into Taliban hands. And lastly, India can simply wait it out, and hope to cut a deal with the victors someday. 

 

In actual fact India has been piggy backing on the western alliance when it comes to what matters most in Afghanistan, the willingness to talk, and be, tough. In the late 1990s, when the world was a much more difficult place, and though far weaker in resources, India still played the tough game in Afghanistan when it supported the Ahmed Shah Masood led Northern Alliance. Which became part of the government in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan following the eviction of the Taliban in 2001. The Taliban hope to replace the Republic as the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.

 

At this stage it is difficult to recreate another Northern Alliance, however much the situation demands. So it is striking to see window stickers in the shops on Kabul’s fancied Chicken Street, with images of Masood and late President Najibullah. And it is also deeply telling. For at the pedestrian level that is the kind of leadership that the people of Afghanistan desire. There is a bit of that in Robert De Niro’s memorable lines as Al Capone in the 1987 mafia classic Untouchables, ‘I grew up in a tough neighbourhood and we used to say “You an get further with a kind word and a gun than you can with just a kind word.”’

 

By Manvendra Singh